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This essay analyzes the circumstances under which a barter system based on merchants and 
centralized markets dominates an unstructured primitive barter system. For that purpose, we set 
up a spatial general equilibrium model where exchange is costly. In an unstructured barter 
system, as population increases, the transaction costs may become cumbersome and the cost of 
trade expansion surpasses its benefits. This imposes limitations on the scope of the economy and 
the production level. To overcome these limitations, rational individuals can develop a more 
advanced barter system based on centralized merchants. This may explains why some economies, 
like the ancient Egypt and the Incas in Peru, did not evolve to a monetary system, and kept barter 
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BARTER ECONOMIES AND CENTRALIZED MERCHANTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The understanding of barter economies is a very important matter in economic theory. Although 
we are sometimes tempted to study them in the context of modern economies, doubtless the 
natural starting point for studying barter economies are ancient and primitive societies. In the 
distant past our ancestors lived in a moneyless, primitive communal system in which people 
produced or found everything they needed to live on, and there were no organized markets. 
Einzig (1966, pg. 333) summarizes the conditions under which a moneyless primitive communal 
system existed. They encompass low levels of intelligence, absence of sense of values, low 
economic development, the absence of private property, no moral or religious taboos, and a 
scarcity or distrust of a good that could serve well as money. However, once these conditions 
were overcome, barter economies appeared and in time, converged to some kind of monetary 
economy. 
Hicks (1969) argues that before the appearance of the division of labor and a systematic 
trading system, societies already had some type of organization. Such an organization requires 
the existence of cities where people interrelate. An organization like this precedes the emergence 
of specialized producers. After this initial stage of primitive trade, Polanyi (1957) finds 
economies moving on to economic systems with a more complete division of labor where people 
exchange their surpluses. He argues that a Redistributive Barter System, a system in which goods 
are sent from the production place to a market center and then redistributed, dominates non-
monetary economies. In the redistributive barter system, individuals produce one or a few goods 
and consume many. They usually go to a market center, often located at the center of the city, and   2
trade the only commodity they have for all other commodities they need. Such trade was made 
through merchants, which dominate the early trade based on pure barter. Polanyi argues that, 
although sometimes we find peddler merchants in such a system traveling from city to city, 
exchanging different kinds of goods and playing an important role for facilitating trade between 
market centers, their role was less important in the direct exchange with final consumers. Most 
anthropologists, see for example Polanyi (1957), Einzig (1966), Davies (1995), and Renfrew and 
Bahn (1996), agree that the redistributive barter system emerged out of a primitive barter system 
and that, with all likelihood, money appeared under this system. Economists like Ederer (1964), 
Hicks (1969, 1989), Clower (1995), and Clower and Howitt (2000) also highlight the role of 
centralized merchants as a previous stage to a monetary system.  
Two well-known examples of redistributive barter systems are the ancient Egypt and the 
Incas in Peru. In the first case, a medium of exchange appeared during the intermediate period 
after the Old Kingdom [Romer (1990)]. The latter never adopted a medium of exchange 
[Brundage (1985)]. One important feature of these two economies was the presence of a strong 
central authority that controlled and organized the intermediation activity [Renfrew and Bahn 
(1996), pp. 351–353]. 
Based on these ideas, this essay analyzes the circumstances under which a redistributive 
barter system with centralized merchants dominates over a primitive barter system. For that 
purpose, we write a spatial general equilibrium model where exchange is costly to compare a 
primitive unstructured barter economy with a redistributive barter economy. 
Section II shows a model of an unstructured barter economy where individuals want to 
consume all goods available. Every individual, who is a specialized producer, meets and barters 
with every other individual in the central market to acquire the consumption goods they need. To 
trade successfully, they incur some transaction costs, which include transport and barter costs.   3
Section III extends the model to incorporate intermediaries. Barter activity is done through 
centralized merchants allowing producers to increase their production. Every producer, however, 
must give up a share of his production to pay for intermediation services.  
Based on the models developed in Sections II and III, Section IV determines the 
conditions under which the redistributive barter economy with centralized merchants dominates 
over the primitive unstructured barter economy. We prove that after population reaches a critical 
size, the emergence of intermediaries contributes to economic growth by lowering the unit cost 
of bartering and inducing the creation of new goods; then, we adopt ad hoc dynamics to provide 
an explanation to the anthropological evidence that motivates this article. Section V concludes. 
II. THE PRIMITIVE BARTER ECONOMY 
Assumptions of the Model 
Consider a narrow city developed on a line along a river that flows from location zero to location 
Gp, where a continuum of L individuals lives. At every location, only one individual locates, and 
each of them is simultaneously a producer and a consumer. Every individual specializes in 
producing only one good, so individuals can be identified by their location, and also the good that 
they produce. They operate in a spatial monopolistic competitive market, so they maximize price 
and there is free entry.  
An undesirable feature frequently present in spatial monopolistic competitive models is 
that individuals’ income varies across locations [see Fujita et. al (1999, Ch. 4) for a discussion]. 
To avoid the complications of dealing with unequals, and to keep the model mathematically 
tractable, we introduce land and a redistributive government, which owns the land for the city; 
then, the government leases the land to individuals at the competitively determined rent at each 
location i, and distributes the revenue from land equally among producers.   4
Each individual sends her production to a market center created at location zero to barter 
it by the goods that she needs for consumption. Thus, as suggested by Hicks (1969), the 
environment is an organized society: there is a city, a government, and a central place where 
individuals interrelate and barter their surpluses. There are no intermediaries and no one can 
transport goods upstream. There is free mobility of factors and everyone consumes at the market 
center. We refer to this economy as the Primitive Barter Economy (PBE). Notice that, in the 
PBE, the number of goods is equal to the number of individuals, that is, L = Gp. 
Consumers￿ Behavior 
There are to be assumed that all goods enter symmetrically into individuals’ demand. The 
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where cj
i is individual i’s consumption of good j, and ρ  is a constant between zero and one that 
represents the intensity of the preference for variety. Therefore, σ  = 1/(1 – ρ ) is the elasticity of 
substitution between any two goods, and it is constant and greater than one. As ρ  decreases, the 
desire to consume a greater variety of goods increases, and the elasticity of substitution between 
any two goods decreases. 
Let Pj be the delivered or c.i.f. price of good j, and Yi the net income of the individual 
dwelling at i; then, individual i faces the budget constraint   ≥
p G
i
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The individual dwelling at location j away from the market center produces xj units of good j; 
then, he ships the output to the market center, incurring in some transport costs. To keep the 
things simple, assume that these costs take the Samuelson (1952) and von Thünen (1826)’s 
iceberg form, that is, if a unit of good i is dispatched from location i to the market center, a 
fraction τ i melts away in transit, 0 < τ  < 1. 
Once in the market center, individual j quotes her merchandize at a price Pj and spends 
some time meeting all other individuals to barter the only good that she has for all other goods 
that she needs. Producers’ only input is labor, measured in units of time. Thus, the primitive 
barter technology represents an opportunity cost for every individual. Assume that if an 
individual must barter with Gp different individuals, their opportunity cost is a share γ Gp of its 
potential production, xi. Therefore, as the scope of the economy (Gp) increases, individuals spend 
more resources to succeed bartering. Notice that if individual j wants to consume the good 
produced by individual k, then j wants to consume only some of k’s production but not her entire 
production. Therefore, the coincidence of wants is not complete and j must trade the rest of her 
production with other individuals until she acquires all the goods that she needs.  
The producer located at j incurs the following labor cost: lj = a + b xj, where a, b > 0. 
Assume that the producer acts as a monopolistic competitive firm, and let Wj be her unit labor 
remuneration. Then, considering the barter and transport costs, if the potential production of the 
individual located at j is one unit of good j, she will barter only (1 – τ j – γ G) in the market center. 
Thus, the firm’s profit function is   6
( ) ( ) j j j j p j bx a W x P G j + − γ − τ − = π 1 . 
Since every individual is simultaneously the firm’s owner and the only worker, there must be 
zero profit, and the labor remuneration is the break-even wage at j. In other words, the individual 
located at j works lj units of time to produce xj units of good j. This merchandize has a value 
equal to (1 – τ j – γ Gp)Pj xj at the market center, which at the same time is equal to her labor 
remuneration. Consider the equilibrium condition for good j ∈  [0, Gp],  
()  = γ − τ −
L
i
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1,  
and suppose that the price of one good has no effect on the demand for any other good; then, the 










Hence, producer j sets a higher price for good j the farther away the production site is, and the 
more expensive the barter system is. The zero profit condition allows finding individual’s 
potential output, xj = a(σ  – 1)/b. Since a, b and σ  are the same for all firms, we can use the 
shorthand x to refer to any individual’s output; then, every individual’s labor is l = aσ . Since we 
can freely choose the units of measurement for labor, we set the fixed input requirement to 
satisfy aσ  = 1, so every individual spends one unit of labor in production, that is, l = 1. We 
regard this as the individual’s labor endowment.  
The individual residing at location j obtains an income is Yj = Wj – R(j) + TDR/L, where 
R(i) is the market rent and TDR is the total differential rent equally distributed by the government 
among producers. The free mobility assumption implies that the market rent adjusts to equalize 
individuals’ equilibrium utility. Thus, individuals’ equilibrium income must be the same in all 
locations. This allows dropping the subscript in individuals’ income and denoting it simply by Y.    7
City Growth 
We can now proceed to analyze how the economy behaves as the city grows, that is, as 
population increases. Since all producers have the same equilibrium income, every individual 
consumes (1 – τ j – γ Gp)x/L units of good j. Considering that L = Gp in the PBE, after doing some 
computations we can write the utility function as  
(1)  () ( ) []
) 1 /( / 1 2 / 1 2 0 ) ( 1 1
− σ σ σ − σ − γ + τ − − γ − = L L
L
A
U pbe . 
Theorem 1: The scope of the economy (Gp) and the city population (L) are bounded by 1/(τ + γ ). 
The result arises because it is impossible to produce some goods at those peripheral locations 
beyond 1/(τ + γ ), since no time would be leftover to individuals after transport and barter costs 
are netted out of the total labor endowment. Hence, the economy cannot be so large and the city 
cannot be so long. Notice also that Upbe is only well defined for 0 < L < 1/(τ + γ ). 
Theorem 2: The equilibrium utility function in the PBE has the following properties: 
i)  Upbe tends to zero as population (L) tends to zero; 
ii)  Upbe tends to  ()
) 1 /( ) 1 /( ) 1 2 (
0
− σ σ − − σ − σ γ + τ τ A  as L tends to the city population upper bound; 
iii) As L tends to zero, the slope of Upbe tends to zero if σ  < 2, tends to infinity if σ  > 2, and 
tends to τ(2σ − 1)/σ  if σ  = 2; 
iv) Upbe reaches a maximum at Lp, where 0 < Lp < 1/(τ + γ ). 
Proof: see Appendix A. 
Figure 1 shows the equilibrium utility function in the PBE in the case where σ  > 2. If σ  were less 
than 2, the only difference is that the curve is convex for small populations. 
FIGURE 1 COMES HERE   8
Observe some interesting properties of the PBE. First, in her shopping trip, every individual 
meets every other individual at the market center. However, she can only barter a share of her 
production, and therefore, there is still a lack of a double coincidence of wants problem. 
Second, the number of goods produces satisfaction, and individuals always obtain 
benefits from agglomeration. Taste for variety makes the consumer choose a quantity of all new 
goods appearing in the market, regardless of their price. Even if the city population grows beyond 
Lp, where individuals’ utility in the PBE reaches a maximum, there is no incentive to live isolated 
since in this case individuals’ utility would be zero. 
Third, growth in the PBE has a limitation since the scope of the economy is bounded. In 
fact, if population becomes greater than or equal to 1/(τ + γ ), individuals dwelling at that distance 
or farther spend much time bartering and traveling to the market center. The combined cost of 
both activities would leave the individual with no output to barter at the city center. 
III. THE BARTER ECONOMY WITH MERCHANTS 
Since bartering is costly, it may occur to someone to accept producer’s output, barter it for all the 
goods he desires, and charge a fee for her service [Hicks (1989) and Clower (1995)]. If this fee 
represents a lower barter cost, the producer would be better off if she dealt with an intermediary, 
and a Redistributive Barter Economy with Merchants emerges. In this section, we extend the 
model to allow the presence of intermediaries. 
Assumptions of the Model 
Suppose that there are F individuals playing the role of centralized merchants in the economy. 
They produce nothing but devote their time facilitating exchanges. Any individual can meet a 
centralized merchant and barter all the goods that she brings for all other goods she wants, that is, 
for a bundle containing some of each of the Gb goods existing in this economy. Producer j quotes   9
his output at a price Pj, and the merchant charges a markup ξ  for its intermediation service, so 
consumers pay a price ξ Pj for one unit of good j.  
Since each centralized merchant barters a bundle containing all goods for a quantity of 
only one good with the producer, each merchant obtains directly from producers, at most, 2g/F 
goods, so each merchant must barter with other merchants to purvey her storage. Suppose that 
the Government organizes the central market in such a way that merchants can exchange the 
merchandize among them at an insignificant cost.  
Producers are still located away and go the market center for barter purposes. Yet, they 
now physically meet only one centralized merchant and not all other individuals, so they 
substantially reduce their barter cost. Assume, for simplicity, that this cost is insignificant. 
Producers behave in a spatial monopolistic competitive environment as defined for the PBE. 
Assume also a full employment condition, so L = Gb + F. Notice that now L is greater than Gb. 
We refer to this economy as the Redistributive Barter Economy (RBE). 
Consumers and Producers￿ Behavior 
Consumers and producers’ behavior is similar in both the RBE and the PBE. However, there are 
two important differences. First, in the RBE, producers do not bear the troublesome barter cost of 
meeting many other producers; and second, since consumers must pay the merchant’s markup, 
they now pay ξ Pj to acquire one unit of consumption good j. This causes some small 
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and the consumption function of good j ∈  [0, G] for individual i, cj = Yiξ
–σ Pj
–σ H
σ−1 . Producer j 
now exchanges (1 – τ j)xj of output, equilibrium condition of good j  ∈  [0, Gb] changes to   10
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. The free mobility 
assumption guarantees that each producer obtains the same income, Y.  
The Intermediaries 
Each centralized merchant prepares a bundle containing cj units of good j ∈  [0, Gb] to barter it 
with individuals. Since all merchants are identical, we may consider symmetric equilibrium. 
Labor is the only merchant’s cost, and every centralized merchant charges a markup ξ . Thus, the 
merchant’s income is 
() F L dj c P c
b G
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Using individuals’ budget constraint, we can write this expression as (1 – 1/ξ )YL/F. The free 
entry condition guarantees that each centralized merchant obtains the same income as producers, 
Y. This allows obtaining the merchant’s markup ξ  = L/(L – F), and from the full employment 
condition, we have ξ  = L/Gb, that is, the merchant’s markup is the ratio between population and 
the number of producers. 
Assume that the intermediation activity works with a constant return to scale technology, 
that is, F workers can barter up to KF units of manufactured goods, regardless of their variety. 
Since the whole production is bartered through intermediaries, 
()  τ − =
b G
dj j x FK
0
1.  
Considering this and the full employment condition, we find the equilibrium number merchants 
and producers  
(2)  kL L Gb τ
− η − η =
2
) (
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where k = K/x is the ratio between the merchant’s capacity to intermediate (K) and the producer’s 
potential output (x), and η  = (1 + k)/τ . Notice that F is always positive. In fact, F > 0 if and only 
if k > ½, i.e., K > x/2. Yet, if an individual owns the technology to produce and barter x units of 
some good, a merchant must be able to barter at least the same amount of merchandize. 
Therefore, k > 1 and this condition always holds. 
Taking derivatives with respect to L, it can be checked that Gb’, Gb’’ and Fb’ are positive, 
and  Fb’’ is negative. In addition, with a bit of calculus, we can prove that the number of 
merchants increases and the number of producers decreases, as transport cost (τ ) increases or the 
merchant capacity decreases (K). This reflects the cost of transport and barter activities in the 
production of goods and the intermediation services. 
City Growth and Transport Costs 
Let’s proceed to analyze the economy’s behavior as the city grows. Since all individuals obtain 
the same equilibrium income, each of them consumes (1 – τ j)x/L units of good j ∈  [0, Gb]. Thus, 
after using some calculus, we can write equilibrium utility as  
(3)  () []
) 1 /( / 1 2 0 ) ( 1 1




Theorem 3: In the RBE, the scope of the economy (Gb) is bounded by 1/τ , and population cannot 
















Since producers cannot bring their production from those peripheral locations farther than 1/τ ; 
then, from (2), we obtain Lmax. This imposes a limitation on the RBE. Notice also that the utility 
function in the RBE is only well defined for 0 < G(L) < 1/τ .  
Theorem 4: The equilibrium utility function in the RBE has the following features:   12
i)  Urbe tends to zero as L tends to zero; 







 as L tends to the maximum possible population in the RBE, Lmax;  
iii) Urbe tends to  ()
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maximum possible population in the PBE, 1/(γ + τ) ; 
iv) Urbe is an increasing function with respect to population. 
Proof: see Appendix B. 
IV. THE PBE AND THE RBE COMPARED 
It is important to note several facts in comparing the PBE and the RBE. First, the presence of the 
centralized merchants allow overcoming the inconvenience of the unstructured barter system 
without adopting a monetary system, since the producer already knows that a merchant will 
barter his entire production for the consumption goods that she needs. 
Second, in the RBE, producers go to the market center only to meet a merchant and not 
all other individuals. This allows them to increase their production and barter a bigger amount of 
output for other goods. On the other hand, they give up a share of their production to the 
merchants. 
Third, prices reflect the transport cost identically in both the PBE and the RBE. However, 
barter costs are reflected different in both systems. In the PBE, it is reflected by a lower 
production available for bartering that diminishes the supply and increases the price. In the RBE, 
the producer’s price is lower, and the markup reflects the fact that the producer gives up a share 
of his production to pay for the intermediation services provided by the merchants.  
Fourth, consider the difference ∆ U = Urbe – Upbe. If ∆ U is positive, the RBE dominates 
over the PBE. If not, the PBE dominates and no merchant is around. Let’s inquire the   13
circumstances under which the RBE dominates over the PBE. Notice that the PBE always 
dominates the RBE for small economies. In fact, taking the limit of Urbe/Upbe as L tends to zero, 


















which is always less than one. The reason is that a small population does not allow 
intermediaries to take advantage of the economies of scale. 
Given the geometrical properties of Upbe and Urbe, we may consider only three possible 
cases. First, the PBE always dominates the RBE for any population level (Figure 2). Second, the 
RBE dominates the PBE after it reaches a maximum (Figure 3), and third, the RBE dominates 
the PBE before it reaches a maximum (Figure 4). 
FIGURE 2, 3 AND 4 COME HERE 
If the RBE dominates over the PBE at some point, it must occur that Urbe > Upbe at the city’s 
lowest upper bound population in the PBE, that is, at L = 1/(τ + γ ). From Theorems 2 and 4, this 
occurs if 
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k k F . Let’s analyze 
the conditions in which (4) holds. This inequality is affected by four parameters: σ , k, τ  and γ . 
J(σ , τ , γ ) + F(σ , k, τ , γ ) is a decreasing function with respect to both σ  and k. Consider first the 
elasticity of substitution (σ ). If the intensity of the preference for variety is too strong, for 
example ρ  tends to zero, so σ  tends to one, individuals always prefer to consume more variety to 
more quantity, and inequality (4) reverses. In this case, the PBE never dominates the RBE, and   14
no merchant ever appears. This also means that, although taste for variety plays an important role 
in our story, it cannot be as high as to make individuals always prefer variety to quantity.  
Consider now k. An increase in k means that the intermediation technology increases 
relative to producers’, so the benefits from the economies of scale in intermediation increase. 
Thus, a higher k encourages the emergence of a RBE. 
Assume that modern individuals have the same preference for variety as our ancestors, so 
we can follow Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999) and choose σ  = 5 in the rest of the analysis. 
Suppose that k = 1. For these parameter values, using numerical calculus we find that inequality 
(4) holds if γ  > 0.27τ , that is, if the opportunity cost of bartering (γ ) is at least 27% of the 
transport cost of shipping the merchandize one unit of distance (τ ). Now, as it was argued before, 
even in the most primitive economy, k is much higher than one. Suppose that the intermediation 
technology increases to, say k = 2, then inequality (4) holds if γ  > 0.07τ ; and for k = 6, it holds if 
γ  > 0.01τ . This means that any major advance in the transport technology, say the invention of 
the wheel and wheelbarrows, could cause the emergence of intermediaries. 
Let’s analyze this result closer. First, the advantage of using intermediaries strongly 
increases as k increases. Second, if the transport cost is so high that population in the PBE never 
reaches the necessary size, individuals will be better off if they do not deal with an intermediary 
and a primitive unstructured barter prevails. Yet, once the transport technology reaches the 
minimum necessary level the necessary conditions appear and make inequality (4) hold. 
Third, the higher the opportunity cost of bartering (γ ), the lower the necessary population 
to take advantages of the economies of scale in intermediation is. We may think that the cost of 
exchanging (γ ) increases with population. In fact, the idea that the inconveniences of the barter 
system are caused by the absence of a double coincidence of wants problem has been around at 
least since Adam Smith, and has been used to justify the existence of a medium of exchange. The   15
modern literature of money and search that uses Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) as a paradigm rests 
on the random matching assumption in an economy with at least three kinds of individuals, a 
very expensive barter cost, to justify the emergence of a medium of exchange. In this case, the 
cost of bartering is an increasing function of population. Intuitively, it may be much less time-
consuming to transport the merchandize from one to the next door than randomly find somebody 
in particular in a population of, say, 50 individuals. 
Suppose now that the technological conditions already exist, so inequality (4) holds, and 
consider either Figures 3 or 4. We will use next some ad hoc dynamics, as suggested by Fujita, 
Krugman and Venables (1999, chapter 1), to study how a redistribute barter economy can emerge 
out of an unstructured barter system
1. If population is small, say less than L
*, producers will be 
better off if they undertake the shopping trip by themselves instead of dealing with a costly 
intermediary, so a spatial general equilibrium will be set in a PBE. Now, let population (L) 
increases a bit and holds it there; if L is still less than L
*, a new equilibrium in a PBE will be set, 
but once population surpasses L
*, some individuals will soon realize that they will be better off 
were they become intermediaries. Producers will also realize that they obtain a higher utility if 
they deal with a centralized merchant, and a RBE emerges.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of centralized merchants represents one step in the specialization process that 
allows increasing the advantages of trade. This is possible because centralized merchants allow 
producers to save time in barter activities and increase their production. Consequently, 
individuals obtain a higher level of consumption and utility.  
                                                 
1 Anas (1992) and Fujita et. al. (1999, chapter 10) use similar ad hoc dynamics to study the emergence of new cities. 
Fujita et. al. (1999, chapter 1) provide an extensive discussion of the use of ad hoc dynamics to study the effects of 
population growth in the new economic geography and the modern evolutionary game theory.    16
Note also that the improvement in the barter system caused by the emergence of 
centralized merchants allows increasing the efficiency of the economy and individuals’ utility 
without needing to adopt a medium of exchange. Moreover, this occurs as a consequence of 
individual’s rational decisions. However, some technological conditions and population size are 
necessary before this process takes hold. On the other hand, an improvement in the transport 
technology allows growth in both the number of goods produced and individuals’ utility. 
In the RBE, the economy can grow beyond the PBE limitations. The city size in the RBE 
now has only the restrictions imposed by the transport technology, which eventually makes 
impossible to produce beyond a certain radius. Yet, the limitation due to barter activities 
disappears since only a fixed and negligible amount of time is consumed in interacting with a 
merchant. This makes possible to lower unit costs.  
Another interesting inquiry refers to the incentives to create a new city. Since equilibrium 
utility never falls to zero as population grow, this incentive does not exist, and the decrease in 
utility in the PBE is overcome by adopting a different barter system. The causes for the birth of 
new cities have different motives, as those mentioned in Anas (1992). 
The model also provides an explanation to some primitive economies like the Peruvian 
Incas and the Egyptians during the Old Kingdom, which kept bartering and never adopted a 
medium of exchange [see Renfrew and Bahn (1996)]. 
Finally, one of the main features of ancient RBEs was the existence of a strong 
centralized authority that organized the redistribution of goods. In our model, this can be 
interpreted as follows. The government sets the market center in a central place. Yet, instead of 
limiting its activity to facilitate the redistribution of the merchandize evenly among merchants 
and let merchants work independently, it directly plays the role of the centralized merchant and 
hires the necessary number of individuals to do the merchants’ job; F is the number of merchants   17
that the government should hire and ξ  is the revenue that the government receives for its services, 
that is, taxes. Notice that if the government decided to increase its revenue excessively and, for 
example, to hire too many merchants, taxes will also increase excessively, individuals’ utility 
may decrease noticeable, and the whole system may fall. This was, perhaps, as argued by Einzig 
(1966, pg. 194), the main reason for the downfall of Egypt after the IV
th Dynasty. 
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APPENDIX A: 
First, let’s define 
() ( )
σ − σ − γ + τ − − γ − =
/ 1 2 / 1 2
1 ) ( 1 1 L L Z  
Taking derivatives respect to L, we have 
() ( ) []










() ( ) () ( ) []
σ − σ − γ + τ − γ + τ − γ − γ
σ
− σ − σ
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+ = M . Applying 
some tedious algebra, we find that Z1 is positive and concave for any possible population size, 
and reaches a maximum at 








which less than that 1/(τ + γ ), the maximum possible population. Now, we can proceed to prove 




− σ σ = Z
L
A
L U pbe , applying the L’Hopital rule, it 
can be easily verified that Upbe tends to zero as L tends to zero. Also, by simple substitution, we 
have that Upbe =  ()
) 1 /( 2 ) 1 /( 1
0
− σ σ + − σ σ + γ + τ τ A  when L = 1/(τ + γ ). This proves (i) and (ii).  



























L dU pbe . 
Also, applying the L’Hopital rule to take the limit as L tends to zero, we find that the slope of 
Upbe tends to zero if σ  < 2 (ρ  < 0.5), tends to infinity if σ  > 2 (ρ  > 0.5), and tends to Z1’(0) if σ  = 2 
(ρ  = 0.5). This proves part (iii). 



























L dU pbe . 
This expression is positive (negative) if dZ1(L)/dL is greater (less) than  ()
L
L Z ) ( 1 1
σ
− σ
, which is 
always positive. Also, it can be easily checked that, as L tends to zero, dZ1(L)/dL is greater than 
()
L
L Z ) ( 1 1
σ
− σ
, and as L tends to the maximum population 1/(τ + γ ), dZ1(L)/dL is less than   20
()
L
L Z ) ( 1 1
σ
− σ
. Since Z1 and dZ1/dL are both continuously differentiable in the interval (0, 
1/(τ + γ )), from the Brower fix point theorem we have that there exist LP between 0 and 1/(τ + γ ) 
such that dUpbe(LP)/dL = 0. 
Q.E.D. 
APPENDIX B: 
First, let’s define 
()
σ − τ − − =
/ 1 2
2 ) ( 1 1 L G Z  
Taking derivatives respect to L, we have 
() ) ( ' ) ( 1
) 1 2 ( / 1 1 2 L G L G
dL




Notice that, as L tends to zero, dZ2/dL tends to (2σ  – 1)K/xση . Since G(L) is always increasing, 
dZ2/dL is always positive, so Z2 is always an increasing function with respect to L. 




− σ σ = Z
L
A
L Ubem , applying 
the L’Hopital rule, we can check that Urbe tends to zero as L tends to zero. This proves (i). Also, 
by substitution it can be easily checked that (ii) and (iii) hold.  
Taking the first derivative with respect to L, we find that dUrbe/dL is positive if  
() () ) ( 1 ) ( 1 0 ) ( '
1
) 1 2 ( 1 / 1 L G L G L L G τ − − τ − > >
− σ
− σ τ − σ  
since σ  > 1 and τ G(L) < 1. Thus, Urbe is always increasing. This proves the theorem.  















THE PBE Always Dominates the RBE 





RBE Dominates the PBE After It Reaches the Maximum 
 
 







RBE Dominates the PBE Before It Reaches the Maximum 
 